

The U-2 and the Crisis

1. What was the relative importance of the roles of the photos in:
 - a) Convincing intelligence analysts?
 - b) Convincing top Presidential advisors?
 - c) Convincing the President?
 - d) Catching the attention of advisors, President?
 - e) Earlier, supporting negative beliefs as to missiles?
 - f) Establishing the relative credibility of various informants?
 - g) Establishing the need for further information?
 - h) Convincing Congress; the press; the public; allies; Soviets; UN.

(Note problem: earlier unsuitability of photographic evidence to convince these critics that missiles were not there; as in Missile Gap crisis.)

(Note McNamara's attempt to use photos in this role, after all, to show that missiles had left; but note the costs of such comprehensive revelations, and limited positive effects).

2. Photos, as information available to a limited group and not outside, create a "data differential" between that group and others including not only the public but the staff of the "elite." This may be reflected in a systematic difference of opinion (e.g., if "outside" group has access to, or is leaked, a part of the information available to elite, e.g., collateral reports or corresponding journalistic sources: Keating), where "elite" is unable to reveal that it has additional information, or what it is. Thus, the difference appears to the critic and to observers as revealing simply a difference in interpretation of the same data, revealing in turn a difference in preconceptions or goals. The photos (or other elite sources) may either negate the other evidence--as prior to Aug. 29, 62 (or to during 1958-60)--or suggest a different interpretation--as between Aug 29 and Oct 14 (SAs)--or reinforce the other evidence--as after Oct 14. In the first case, the Administration will seem lethargic, inattentive, wishfully negligent, or bound by the inertia of preconceptions, etc--particularly to those who do have access to ~~the~~ opposing data and thus have a claim to be recognized by public as "informed experts" (note legacy of Gaither Committee, particularly during 1958-60; general position of Congressional critics and non-profit "experts"). There is, in fact, often enough a basis for this charge, and it is difficult for the public to distinguish those cases in which this is not so (especially because security relating to the special information is often kept unusually well).

In latter two cases, Gov may be tempted to release photost to support its case; but if it does not, it can now appear reckless, wishful, too ready to jump to conclusions on insubstantial evidence; fears as ~~its~~ to its probable future "false alarm rate" may arise, and precautionary measures taken by Allies and opponents.

To guard the source of its special information, elite may even be forced to take actions counter-indicating their possession of it. (This may arise when the data-differential refers to the existence of detailed plans or covert objectives. Note Nixon dilemma when JFK proposed aiding invasion of Cuba; the dilemma when Stevenson proposed stopping tests?

What is the result?

3. Different impact of negative and positive results from photos. Distinguish between photos that negate other evidence--as when photos show definitely that there are no missiles on a particular site, contrary to specific reports--and photos that fail to confirm other evidence or to point in the same direction--as when photos failed to show that missiles were being dismantled, or showed conflicting indications.

Is it generally true that negative evidence from photos, or even failure to confirm other evidence, is given more weight at high levels than at lower levels of analysis, or more weight than it should get? Or, are there circumstances in which this occurs?

Even where the photos strongly negate some specific hypothesis of interest, there may be other specific hypotheses, or broader hypotheses, almost as plausible a priori, which these photos simply fail to confirm (or even support). Proponents of the earlier, discredited hypotheses will be motivated to generate such alternatives: less hurt by this specific evidence, and perhaps less vulnerable to this form of test. This motivation may discredit the search operation; yet the hypotheses it turns up may be worthy of consideration.

E.g.; a) Should the Administration have been as confident as it was (?) in the adequacy of U-2 coverage prior to May, 1960? What does Cuba affair tell us about this? How about MRBM/IRBMs?

b) How much confidence can be placed in photo evidence that all missiles were removed from Cuba?

c

Can there be "hard" evidence of a negative nature, except as relating to a highly specific hypothesis? Are photos that fail to show certain phenomena treated as being as "hard" as if they distinctly showed other phenomena?

(The following is a list of references to the above.)

1. How explain that missiles were transported clandestinely, but not constructed covertly?

2. How does installation and operation of SAMs in Cuba compare with practice elsewhere when SAMs have been deployed? With Soviet practice?
Have they ever activated SAMs piecemeal?

3. What was Sept. 10 flight cancelled because of Chinat shootdown?

4. What if Aug. 30 and Sept 8 U-2 incidents had occurred prior to Aug. 29;

a) Would SAMs have been discovered so early?

b) In absence of flights, might collateral reports have caused more concern?

c.g., in absence of evidence on SAMs, suggesting alternative explanation?

5. Is absence of recon, because of incidents or weather, reflected in planning or declaratory activity? (Or are planning activities geared to the expectation that recon will continue or proceed soon, with no adjustment for unexpected delays?)

6. Is there a tendency to react to information-flow as if it closely corresponded to flow of events being observed? E.g., to react to sudden exposure to data as if external events had moved rapidly (e.g., increase of info on missiles between 16 and 18 Oct ~~xxxx~~ because of increase in coverage; tendency to treat as if revealing crash activity? Sudden increases in identification of activities not previously covered or recognized; does this create crisis atmosphere? e.g., SA-2s after 29 Aug.; SA-2s in East Germany and SU)

Or does lack of newly confirming evidence create atmosphere that "nothing new is happening," even though lack may reflect absence of recon for weather or other reasons. Or, "something may be happening but there is no 'hard' evidence of it." E.g., Admin statements about missiles in period 5 Sept--14 Oct; or intell. statements about dismantling, 30 Oct--2 Nov.

7x

7. Who knew of emergence of SAM system on 26-27 Oct in US? How was it interpreted, at the time? Who analysed it for ExComm?

8. How might this have been related to shootdown of U-2 on 27 Oct? When, in what sequence, did news of this come in? How was it interpreted, in various stages, by various people?

9. What evidence is there that SU considered concealment from high-alt photography possible?

10. Is there reason to believe that missiles did not come on ship prior to mid-Sept?

11. With what other Sov operations can this deployment be compared? What are differences, similarities: e.g., in secrecy, concurrency, site preparation, C&C, security, timing, manning? How much intelligence did we get out of it? Was this foreseeable by Sovs? (Was this reason for predicting Sovs wouldn't put base here?)

Southard: 21 April

Fomin told Scali, Sat morning (27 Oct) that K had not received reply from State before sending Sat. morning letter on Turkey-Cuba. This was blatantly untrue; Fomin got reply about 7:30-8 Friday night, must have sent it immediately, K would have had it about 12 hours before broadcast of Turkey letter.

((But: might Fomin know of a foulup in comm, or or delay in transmitting to K at other end? Consider delays in Moscow--Washington. Might K have been unavailable? What was means of transmission from Russian Embassy in Washington? How does Hot Line change this?))

((Who knew of Scali deal Friday night: before ExComm meeting? Was ExComm told? Who knew by Saturday-Sunday? Did some see the Friday night letter without knowing of Scali; how did they interpret it? Who knew on Saturday that there had been a Friday night answer to Scali; in effect, an answer to the Friday night letter?

What were beliefs of Ex Comm, President, as to whether K had received reply to Scali before sending Turkey letter?

Were other channels being used simultaneously: Dobrynin-RK, Dobrynin--Thompson, Kohler-Gromyko? (Pachter). Were British in circuit? Friday night? Saturday?

S. believes: K got Scali reply Friday night, and this reassured him that US, interested in negotiating this deal, was unlikely to take violent action immediately; K had time to try Turkey deal.

((But how about Scali emphasis on "little time"?))

Question then becomes: What changed his mind 24 hours after Turkey letter?

S. answer: the "signal of utmost alarm." (See Pachter)

((Were there other channels as well?

Was threat specific? Did it unequivocally go beyond increasing the blockade? Was it regarded by JFK as absolute commitment? What did he foresee as possible, provable responses? When exactly was it sent? Relation to concern over retaliation against Turkey?

Is it possible there was direct answer Saturday night? Might retal. against Turkey ever have been specifically threatened?

(S. thinks not).

Why didn't K use more of period allowed? (Analogy: immediate turning back of snips after speech?)

((Why is signal held so tightly? Why are all private comms held quite so tightly? Has there been bad past experience on this?

S. had not considered possibility that U-2 shootdown, if accident, might have frightened K. (Note Pachter: according to RK, it did determine JFK to increase recon and blockade. And...?)

((How would "signal" of dismantling Turk missiles have appeared in combination with this? ~~Was~~ Was this considered?

Who on ExComm, others, knew of Signal?

Southland started bad, with assumption that ~~SIXTYEIGHT~~ the public
wouldn't give the private sector one cent's worth of support.

((Certainly Dept 11 documents and Gropyko statements used in describing the role of the Sov "specialists"--and hence were extremely misleading.))

S. Study started with a directive from McC to analyse what it was ((not, whether?)) that we had done that had led ~~to~~ K to believe that he could get away with it.

Rostow points to his memo of Aug '62, pointing to pressures on K, and possibility that they might lead him to: 1) improve strategic balance; 2) put pressure on Berlin; or 3) increase Cuba as militant base. But 1 and 3 did not lead Rostow to predict missiles in Cuba; rather, his paper indicated building up Cuba as a base for subversion.

((It is a plausible hypothesis that int. comm. is inhibited from taking "reassuring signals" fully, explicitly, or realistically into account, either consciously or in published results.))

Thus; his "explanation" still leaves action unlikely; he is forced to regard it as "irrational": impulsive, erratic, wishful, reckless.

((S. tends to emphasize: K probably gave more weight, wishfully, to reassuring signals than he should. He doesn't consider as much that K may have given more weight to incentives--considered situation more urgent, alternatives worse--than he "should." How about "last change" aspect? How about effect of recent improvement in balance?))

Concept and execution clearly indicate that Sov authorities made no appreciable effort to prevent or delay US detection by aerial recon during the deployment phase. /of the offensive weapon
It is believed that the most likely explanation is that they judged the risk of a US military reaction to be very slight.

((Mandelstam: they had camouflage nets with them--this degree of preparation--but didn't use them till late in October (date?); first camouflage in response to low-level flights on 23 Oct was natural cover (?). M. guessed a failure by local commander to carry out camouflage plan; or perhaps nets were not loaded correctly, etc. One analyst told him nets would have delayed recognition a couple of weeks. "Infrared gear was not being used, though available (?).))

((Did Sovs believe it possible to prevent detection? Report says would have been difficult to conceal IRBM sites; though could have delayed starting these.))

Concurrency: Sov concept obviously did not envision the initial establishment of an island defense in order to test US reaction and screen the subsequent introduction of strat missile forces.

((So McC guess was wrong in reasoning, though right in conclusion. But does failure to use SA-2's against U-2's indicate indifference? Would Sovs have been willing to shoot down a U-2? Report doesn't comment.

SA-2's could have been more deterrent if they had activated radars. Or would they? They were deterrent, weren't they; overflights did cease for over a month. (Were SA's a factor?) Might this have been hoped by Sovs? (presumably not, given failure to activate).))

In (In concluding that Sovs regarded risk as low, failure to use SA-2's is one ground; another, no apparent effort to minimize time during which some MRBM units were detectable before all of the MRBM units were operational--but would this be critical to US reaction, once some units were operational?

Third: failure to camouflage.

The conclusion seems inescapable that the Sov authorities () chose to ignore the distinct possibility of US overflights in planning the Cuban operation. This choice seems inexplicable unless the Soviet leaders judged with considerable assurance that the US would acquiesce in the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba--or at least that the US would not attempt to force their removal by reacting militarily--and hence that the possibility of US detection was not critical to the success or failure of the venture.

((But: no mention of the fact that this was not a departure from familiar pattern, but a reproduction of standard procedure in SU: careful ground screening, deceptive public statements and private statements, covered movements, but open to air recon; it does not have to be explained on ad hoc basis (this is to ignore organizational/procedural inertia, compartmentalization, lack of adaptation). Also, little attention to measures that were taken to cover and deceive; SU grounds for pessimism as to success; and alerts (discounted)).

(Myth of Monolith? Of choice, planning, intention, coordination, system adaptation?)
 Pooled Lgs. that Optimum is a rational & informed decision - mean?)

Exercises of "Lull" ^{or, to be known (probably intended)} ^{to be known (probably intended)}

2.

Possibility considered that actual planners were unaware of or grossly underestimated US recon capabilities; seems unlikely. But reasons for dismissing are U-2 trial, and Sov recognition there of U_s capabilities; and fact that Chief of Air Defense at that time became Chief of SRF. Can this be dismissed?

(Rules of the game): Having lived restively under the shadow of US strategic bases for more than a decade, the Sov leaders ~~may~~ probably have come to regard them, particularly in the age of the ICBM, as a disquieting but not major phenomenon of great power relations. Castro's Cuba provided K with ~~xxx~~ his first opportunity to establish an overseas military base. He may have felt confident that the US would understand the rules as he did: that military bases on the opponent's periphery are facts of great power life which fall far short of a provocation to war.

((If so, he failed to see asymmetry of power as a rule of the game; or was ready to change it, in which case he could have foreseen resistance, or possibility that US hadn't noticed it was time for a change.

Or: is it possible that bases really weren't as salient for SU, by now, as for US; i.e., that Turkey no longer "provokes" them to extent that Cuba does us? Is it possible he really underestimated: a) the degree to which this move would provoke us, or irritate us--aside from the likelihood of US response; b) the gains to him--or losses to us--which, in our judgment, he would have achieved if we had acquiesced? i.e., that one reason he judged likelihood of response as low is that he underestimated degree of motivation.))

Objectives:

Strategic change produced by Cuba would have been short-lived, given planned increases in US ICBM and Polaris deployment in 1963; reason for expecting success to be followed by attempt to achieve dramatic victory elsewhere, Berlin.

((Berlin 1962 was thus an Averted Crisis. Cuba 1962 is an example of a crisis in which Sov victory would have consisted precisely in establishing a base for a substantive victory in a subsequent crisis, or phase.

Les Crises en Chaine. (or: The Century of Crisis.)

Noise and Inference:

More than 200 reports refer to presence on Cuba of missiles before Jan 62. Numerous reports refer to construction activity and equipment observed during spring of 1962 in areas where SAM sites were located later; however, photography failed to reveal any such activity or equipment. But strong possibility that this reporting reflected influx into Cuba, beginning in early 1962, of Sov personnel (and vehicles?) somehow connected with the buildup beginning physically in late July.

((Hypothesis: A common pattern, like that in Cuba: Forerunners of later threat--perhaps personnel, rumors, phenomena not observable by air recon--give rise to exaggerated agent reports of observable activity; 2) photos disprove presence of such activity, and tend to discredit totally, or excessively (?) the agent reports; so that 3) later reports, based on firmer grounds, find preconceptions hardened against them, and reduced/delayed tendency even to accept risks and costs of checking them by further recon (note suspension of flights); especially if 4) photos do turn up phenomena that serves as alternative explanation for reports.

Typ II: Negative results from photos have--unjustifiably--a strong effect on expectations comparable to that of positive results; and have excessive weight in undermining positive agent reports.

3.

((Hyp II follows automatically if it is the case (Mandelstam) that top decision-makers (Ike?) really look seriously only at photos, SI, dismiss agent reports; then negative results from former are essentially the only evidence considered.

Task: analyze timing and content of data available only from agent reports.

In light of experience, evaluate relation of collateral sources and photos, SI; are they being best used to complement each other?))
Are collateral sources underused by top decision-makers? Should latter be wary of ~~expanding~~ using other sources to invalidate totally the "smoke" shown by collateral sources?

Examine the total "noise" background of collateral sources.

Examine preconceptions which analysts, and decision-makers bring to evidence: not only gross ones (SU wouldn't do it)) but details of linkages (McC: If SA's come, can MRBM's be far behind?)

In Cuba, some Sov activities observed for first time ((likewise, US)): so: a) they couldn't be fully interpreted at the time; (b) in future, it will be possible to interpret them, thanks to Cuba.

((Same for US; question: impact of Cuba on ability to interpret each other's behavior, and to communicate if desired, in future crises. WHAT ALERTING/PREPARATORY PROCEDURES HAVE STILL NEVER BEEN OBSERVED, ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER? What surprises, confusions, might this create in future, intense crisis? Can these serve to define levels of intensity, as yet unobserved? What will serve to flag the unprecedented nature of a future crisis? Are top decision-makers aware of degrees of unprecedentedness of US actions they may contemplate? and of difficulties of interpretation, as well as of signal of intent?

Was US dispersal in Cuba the waste of a powerful signal (Bennington/Schelling); in what ways did use then condition impact of a similar act in future?

Sovs: tested possible Air Defense fight dispersal plan, beginning in May 62; crisis took place in fall, when Sov forces are at peak proficiency (for Berlin crisis?); may have restricted preparations to a minimum to ensure strategic surprise.

Sovs Sept 11 alert appeared to be a response to militant US announcements ((How was it interpreted by US decision-makers? As political play?))

In retrospect, appears to have been initiated as a response to the 7 Sept request by JFK for authority to fall up reserves because, unknown to US, this call-up coincided with the initial introduction of missiles into Cuba. In all probability, the call-up caused grave concern in the USSR about possible US knowledge of their 'missile venture'. This alert was reduced in late Sept or early Oct after the Sovs realized that their missile venture was continuing undetected by the US.

((But 5 Sept recon would not have disclosed missiles; they might have started arriving by 7 Sept (could they have by 2 Sept?), but Sovs knew no flights (might they have feared 5 Sept flight showed something? e.g., 29 Aug flight showed vehicles and construction material at IRBM sites))

15 Oct: standby alert, probably because of Sov realization that venture had been detected by 14 Oct flight

16 Oct: activation of Sov Far East weather reporting for North America for first time (?)

23 Oct Sat Forces placed on alert

Yarmolinsky, May 16

Told of missiles by McN about 0730 Oct 16. McN reaction then was: This shows how stupid it was to draw that line; I ~~was~~ advised against it.

McN thought there might not have had to be a crisis if JFK hadn't drawn the line.

Y. thinks it unlikely that JFK would have made the firm, precise commitment he did if he had thought there was much chance it might be called. He made it public only for political reasons. ((This doesn't say he wouldn't have wanted to move; reflects general politician's aversion to making advance commitments when he doesn't have to.))

If commitment had not been made, SU move would not have had the ominous significance it did: of "calling" us; of putting Pres and US prestige so clearly at stake.

((Would K success have been so marked if it had not been made in face of US commitment? Perhaps so: because fact of putting missiles into Caribbean--still apart from military significance--would have been still noted; in effect, people would say we should have drawn a line, or would have if situation really favored us, or if we had any guts or were really willing to use force.

Still, if K expected to succeed despite commitment, then commitment would make his victory still greater (just as "naming" K by JCK on Oct 22 made success greater, though perhaps less likely). Thus, though JFK's public statements of 4 and 13 Sept, though they might have raised in K's mind the probability of a US counter, might also have raised the potential rewards in K's mind and might have left the prob of US action still low (especially if he thought JFK already knew of plan for missiles, in addition to his willingness to swallow SAMs, etc.)

((Did K realize what a difference the difference between SAMs and MRBMs was? The main, essential difference is that the US public thought there was a difference. Were they excited about SAMs? Not too much? But Russian troops might have been a different matter; maybe Il-28's.

Why was there not a SAM crisis? An Il-28 crisis? A build-up crisis?

Given that US public was so sensitive to missiles--given that their presence would inevitably cause public pain, hence cause politicians pain--then failure to move effectively would raise questions about US power and will to use its power to avert or remove pain and satisfy public and leaders' feelings: ~~quicker~~ regardless of whether or not the Russian move constituted a "real danger" or would make a "real difference" in a war.

Moreover, willingness to cause such pain in US would suggest to observers that K--presumably in a good position to know, presumably a prudent man--regarded JFK power and resolution with contempt, skepticism: especially with JFK commitment, but even without.

What was purpose of Sov deception? Who were they trying to deceive? Note pattern of making tough, deceptive statement after having invalidating it, by action, private statement: ships would run blockade (to businessman, JFK on 24 Oct, after publicly known ships had turned away (though still question of remaining ships: only 2 dry cargo?); Tass-man statement on 23 Oct; 27 Oct letter;

Can they have hoped to deter recon? Or to convey message that they would not reveal missiles, if we didn't, before election?

What did members of ExComm make of Sov intent in statements? How did they react?

What is K theory of significance of US elections? Had he promised not to embarrass, on 23 Aug (to Sorenson?) Might he have thought we were hoping, above all, that he would not break news before election?

Dobrynin-Sorenson, Aug 23, Sept 6; ~~Dobrynin-Bowles~~ Bol Oct 1 (Oct 23);
(Aug. 29?)

Dob-Bowles, Oct 13; Gromyko Oct 18.

Hils: S may have told F, 2 or 3 days.

Gore: 20 Oct: 2

V: if what you have right to do to Cuba, we have right to do to Turkey or Iran. (But Turkey and Iran are weak, no threat).

If balance is equal, equal rights.

We will not disturb balance; No, we will not commit ourselves not to expand, not to upset balance...

We had miscalculated, e.g. in Cuba. Interpretation: you made a mistake in Cuba.

Why secrecy of comm? Reluctant to make explicit ultimatum; embarrass K, make it hard to accept?

See Vienna,

McC's role fairly creditable. honeymoon messages, late Aug --third week in Sept: took evidence of SAMs as confirming suspicions; as compared to analysts, gave more weight to possibility of irrational, radical, out-of-pattern move by K; and gave more weight to actual advantages of move to K. Criticised est. of Sept 19 ((often may give verbal dissent from est--verbal footnote--in giving it to Pres))

((Did analysts give too much weight to the "obvious" risks of move: not only judging perception of these risks by Sovs, without direct evidence, but judging "actual" risks--in effect, predicting decisions of US Pres. How well qualified is anybody now--and in particular, Sov experts or intelligence analysts in general--to make this prediction? How much was it based on general considerations, generalized circumstances, rather than on a variety of specific circumstances, or a predicted range of circumstances?))

((McC tendency to have great confidence in his intuitions; reluctant to change in face of analysts evidence or argument. Is Was he then also unfettered by knowledge or experience or weight of past evidence on K behavior?

Yet, how much evidence was there for analysts--Kent--implicit assumption that K's behavior was stable, rational, informed, predictable, prudent? Let alone, that this is fair assumption for most political leaders.))

Not ready to make yet. With the old structure, it is of
one design, but the design is not. The old design is of
for the purpose of the old design. The design is of the old design.

Because of the old design, the old design is of the old design.
of design is of the old design, we can say with no loss in time
or resolution in the old design.

Computation of the old design is of the old design. The old design
(which is). Now, the old design is of the old design. The old design
integrity of the old design is of the old design.

which is of the old design.

Other design is of the old design. The old design is of the old design.

KBM reliability: the number of minutes for the old design.
(~35/yr)

630 3.53 72 23 = 14,490

(1960) 5799 17 (134)

50 3.53 13 = 1090

(1961) 375

(4-433 + 1053) = 15,530

1962 0

Total 17,400 (1964)

Forbman 18,500 70.6
17,100

65 73 (91)
100 70 70

Annual 52 1-53 (4) 11.2
2 Handbags (1.1)

15,500
16,952.3 new

High altitude - high GSP
Low alt - more accurate - 2 MT
Multiple loading
ASMS

2 53's = 1 65 MT

71 72
14,823 15,083

24 72
33.6 11340
48.5 4543
28.1
133.7 16,829

46 150
13 56 169 273 433 572

195-57 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7

22 Oct. Cover letter to K with speech. Refers to discussion at Vienna, Pres assertion there that US would not allow SU to take actions overturning present balance of power.

((Balance then conceived as "equal"? But now conceived as unequal, favoring US; we were, in effect, still proposing to prevent K from producing drastic change in balance of power, in direction of equality. Meanwhile, K had vigorously rejected this position at Vienna, refused to renounce efforts to change the balance of power in Russia's favor.))

had given specific example there of possible miscalculation of US determination: trying to destroy US rights of access to Berlin.

Do not mistake moderation of current action for lack of determination; we are determined that missiles shall be removed. I hope you will act prudently, have ships comply with quarantine.

K reply, 23 Oct: cover letter with public reply. You have no right to take action. Weapons of Cuba, whatever their character, are for defensive purposes. Cuba is small, cannot be a threat to giant US.

Reply (?) 23 (?) Oct: You started this, by putting missiles in Cuba ~~xxxxxxxwithxxxxquarantinedates~~

F reply to quarantine: put yourself in my position; ultimatum; cannot comply; prize piratical; have ordered captains not to comply.

((But had ordered them to turn morning of 23 Oct, before OAS vote; they changed course about noon; Navy didn't report this to ExComm till 24 Oct; announced 25 Oct.))

reply, 25 (?) Oct: refers to Shipments in August, Pres statements. You made deceptive statements, in public and private, assuring that no offensive weapons were being sent. On the basis of this assurances, I ~~xx~~ publicly restrained those who wanted to take action. Then I learned that recently you had been installing missiles.

26 Oct letter at US Emb in Moscow at 1000, probably sent about 0930 Washington time; it didn't begin arriving till about 1800 (discussed at ExComm meeting at 2000).

F met with S about noon, Wash time; F called earlier (when?). Sou infers F offer sent earlier than letter, as it arrived; but times seem consistent with F offer being conceived at same time or later than letter, transmitted to F about same time or even after letter sent. Makes sense to me that F offer was a specification of vague "proposal" in letter ((which says only that if US would give guarantee...then situation would change, everything would be different; this would destroy need for technicians. Can't speak for C but he would no longer have need for mobilization. I propose: you guarantee drop quarantine; we would (send no more arms?); then necessity for weapons you term offensive would disappear.)) Reply to F might have signalled: no couple of days before US action (?); and, highly likely that this offer would be accepted if others failed; ~~xxxxxx~~

continued:

if this had failed, no use trying tougher one, in private let alone in public; 27 Oct letter--sent about 24 hours after 26 Oct letter, and after S reply to F (presumably, after receipt of F report in Moscow) may have been public probe, public in part because hope of generating public support for it (also, to speed delivery?)

((Sie: Rusk maintains emphatically that 27 Oct letter was a result of public suggestions by Lippman on 25 Oct and Kreisky (Lippman not available for reflection in Moscow in time for 26 Oct letter?))

(Note: US couldn't charge "bad faith" because even if they had been public, neither 26 Oct letter nor ~~2 F~~ "question" could be described as a commitment to a definite offer. E.g., 26 Oct letter doesn't mention Turkey, but doesn't say that missiles would be removed, either. The "necessity" for them would disappear (not necessarily missiles)--~~ixm~~ SU had denied necessity for them even before crisis, but had put them in anyway--but that could mean, they are unavailable for bargaining, e.g., against those equally "unnecessary" missiles in Turkey. The F offer, in contrast, was a specific trade, in which Turkey did not figure: but was purely hypothetical.

Acceptance of F offer did not bind K at all (or US); but it revealed acceptability of this to US, thus gave him strong basis for believing he could get at least this; in absence of this, he might not have felt free to spend time probing, in view of other signals.

Sou, Sie: tendency of ExComm officials to deprecate F-8 exchange in view of 26 Oct letter; but would that not have appeared quite ambiguous if the F offer were not available to make if specific? Note that our reply of 27 Oct is essentially to F offer, not to 26 Oct letter.

By sending F offer, K in effect got an immediate reply to his 26 Oct letter, read in a form favorable to US; in effect, he had US public reply of 27 Oct on the night of 26 Oct or early morning of 27 Oct: probably before sending 27 Oct letter. ((whereas public impression--and of how many members of ExComm, staff?)), he didn't get reply to either before he had sent both.

Big US decision of afternoon of 27 Oct was not to combine two letters but to ignore 27 Oct letter; meanwhile, threatening (as retaliation to Anderson, or to further shootdowns? Or, just as "retal" to failure to remove missiles? What was threatened, or rapid implied? If Anderson stressed, this suggests action against SAMs; if missiles, missiles. What was feeling of ExComm about Anderson, and about implications of prior commitments about U-2s and political consequences of inaction. Was K "forcing our hand"? (See Sie account of Ball reaction)).

((

14 May

Did K have reason to imagine that JFK might hold information tight till after election, or longer?

Sonn: crate evidence was available (to?) prior to Sept 19 estimate but was not distributed to estimators; Air force analysts were convinced it was 11-20's. Item got in Bull one day toward end of September, but was withdrawn and order went out there were to be no further items included and no further speculations published on subject. Not mentioned publicly till Oct 22. He believed at time Admin. meant to withhold it till after election. K may have believed we knew it, drew same inference.

(Note: Bowles-Dobrynin conversation later, Oct 13; now did Bowles interpret this? What was plan? Why did we not confront, ask? Was there a "crisis" at news?)

Moreover, Sonn believed and believes that K thought we knew by Sept 13 at least--planes were flying, scratches were to be seen (by Sept 5? was that flight over right area--no--or did K know exactly what it might have seen? Or might he have thought we would have agent reports?) and took Sept 13 statement as evidence that JFK did not mean to announce or react.

But now could JFK fail--and how could K think he would fail--to release news or react, after statements of 4 and 13 Sept?

Sonn did believe, and belief was general, in week of discovery, that K intended to announce missiles in connection with Berlin, when they were ready, maybe the day after the election; K's statements connecting Berlin with after election did sink home, Thompson thesis that missiles were connected with Berlin was accepted, hence timing; moreover, pace suggested this. (It was not immediately clear when they would be operational. Also, it was not clear that any were operational then; it seemed likely that K would regard deterrence as better, against invasion or attack, when all were operational, and "one might go off.")

Sonn doesn't think ExComm did consider withholding news (note how many NEW knew by Oct 15; did this many, outside of int analysts, know of 11-20's?). But they were concerned about one possibly going off, perhaps captured or controlled by Cubans! Couldn't sit still with that possibility!

McN said (Sonn, Hil) from Tuesday to Thursday: in purely military strategic terms, no problem, just extra targets, makes no difference; no crisis (this was interpreted by L&R as arguing for inaction; but was this McN's recommendation, or was he merely abstracting from political considerations to give comment on wartime implications?)

Weiss: in my thesis, don't emphasize election so much in Cuban case as factor that K thought would make JFK so reluctant to announce to public; election may have been tactical consideration, adding insurance, but W. thinks main consideration would have been record of previous two years, leading K to think that JFK would accept move; hence, K would have been about as willing to do it in spring, or after election. (?) Berlin 1961 would be exception in pattern (though, Berlin Wall). ((But, maybe that taught K that the overt challenge was mistake, would force JFK's hand; what would get him to "cooperate" would be fait accompli, in public's eyes; public must not have proof too early, JFK must not be forced to give proof too early and JFK public must not have proof later that JFK knew earlier. (photos

14 May

Hils: F-S exchange essential to interpretation of 26 May letter. The two were probably sent as a package ((K might guess: more likely to get answer to F offer earlier; and more likely to get good answer to letter if read in light of F offer.))

F was resident. (sure?)

Rusk told S to call F Saturday afternoon, wrote out message. S saw F at 1030, berated him in violent terms for Saturday morning message negating Friday night offer; said we never, never would consider Turkey deal in the slightest; said letter "means war." Said he spoke for himself, but hinted he reflected mood of higherups.

(F claimed at start, and later, that K had not had F message at time he wrote Saturday morning letter.)

S had dinner with F Sunday night; F said he had been instructed to tell S that his services were much appreciated, and had been very valuable. In particular, that applied to his "explosion" Saturday afternoon.

Hils feels: Rusk took S channel very seriously at time, spent much time and attention with it; definitely influenced interpretation, and was basis for Trollope ploy. (Says Excomm was jubilant at 1000 Saturday morning, till new letter came in). F offer was only offer of inspection ((till Saturday morning letter?)), and F-S exchange Saturday afternoon the only brutal, explosive exchange known to Hils to convey mood to K.

Hughes checked out Keating claim of Oct 10, at the time, that there six LRBA sites; int comm had no basis for this; no refugee reports mentioned six, or total number; there were two good reports about Oct 10--could have been around earlier--but they referred to storage sites at Remedios. Hils thinks Keating got this out of the air.

(But consider position it put administration in, with their flat statements on "I know there is no evidence on missiles...I think it extremely unlikely they would put missiles in.")

Sonnenfeldt, Bob Baraz, 16 April.

Sonn. told morning of 16th by Hilsman.

On Scali: Sonn had gone home Friday evening; was called back by Hilsman about 9:15, told about Scali and about K letter. Spent all night working on paper analyzing the two developments, comparing them, to be presented by Hilsman to ExComm the next morning. ((Was Sorenson working on reply that night? Did ExComm have a draft to consider when it met at 10?))

Scali ~~xxx~~ came to Hilsman; they were with Rusk, about 6, when K letter began to come in; it came last section first (the "business end") and came in to them all, discussed in front of Scali. It seemed to confirm Scali story, which was more precise: called for UN supervision and inspection, offered to withdraw. Scali sworn in, "cleared," discussed answer.

Thus, while letter alone might have been more ambiguous, Fomin offer had considerable impact on its interpretation. In considering a draft reply, they were in effect taking the details from the Fomin offer. Later, when Saturday letter came in, the final reply could be interpreted as taking the details--the specific offer to withdraw and the terms of inspection--from the Fomin offer (or the Saturday letter), rather than from the Friday night letter (which didn't have them), while ignoring the Turkey deal.

((Sonn admits they may overemphasize the Fomin-Scali episode, because of being in on it and close to it. Sieverts says other members tend to deprecate it, say it was the word from K himself that was regarded as important (but couldn't Fomin have influenced interpretation of that?) and "We didn't have any need ~~xx~~ for informal contacts, outsiders; we had plenty of contact, e.g., Tommy" (but might not Sovs have preferred approach through Scali, to whom they had no responsibilities, could disown?) (Note that Tommy prefers to believe that Dobrynin didn't know the story--which is probably true, but also convenient, allowing Tommy to continue his relationship with him).))

ExComm was undoubtedly very relieved Friday night, early Saturday morning; thought it was over. (Could they really relinquish this mood, of having won "peacefully" through threats rather than attack, by Saturday or Sunday--give up hope of settlement and turn to choice of attack?)

Rostow probably didn't know Saturday morning of Friday night letter (or Scali); Tyler and his deputy didn't.

((Rostow operation generally a backwater; Sonn: It would have made more sense to have that operation after the crisis--rather than tie up as many good people as it did. Consider analogy to the crisis operations at R&D. Did they have any impact, on anyone? Did they have enough information, were they enough in touch?))

Next day, Scali gave Fomin hell about Turkey letter: what's going on, you never said anything about Turkey. Fomin seemed embarrassed.

There were further Scali-Fomin contacts.

3. Baraz' paper of 12-19 Oct exemplified earlier Hilsman thesis that intell. should ~~consequently~~ consider consequences of U.S. actions; but also, role that this puts I&R into of imagining and quasi-evaluating U.S. policies. While still regarding their missiles as unlikely, he was asking: "But suppose they did put them in, What might we do, and what would the likely responses be to these actions, by SU, Cubans, allies, neutrals? "

(("How could the Sovs have achieved a fait accompli? How could they have prevented a US crisis--by convincing us that 'There was nothing to be done,' too late, no challenge to action, no opportunity to avert undesired change in the status quo. How could they have delayed our discovery; stayed our hand; increased risks to us of action, reduced incentives?

"How could they have triggered a US ~~x~~ direct attack on missiles? Did they know what it took? Might they have done it? "

Baraz:

If Sovs had earlier put MRBMs into a satellite: that would have made it look less unlikely that he would put them into Cuba; yet, it would still look like a "first" for him, a switch: It would still be outside the Warsaw Pact, a country without an alliance, not really, yet, fully within the Bloc, at such a long distance, with an unreliable leader.

((Were the peculiar advantages of putting missiles into Cuba, as opposed to other locations, taken fully into account? The various incentives so clear now to Southard? And how reliable were these former patterns held to be; how reliable, on past experience, was the very notion that "K doesn't break from his patterns"?))

One aspect of Hilsman--I&R line on including Castro in threats was: K's reaction when confronted with an indirect challenge was much more predictable; his reaction if confronted with a direct ultimatum much less so.

2. Sonnenfeldt

Night of 21-22 Sept, Hilsman tried to persuade Mike Forrestal to include Castro in denunciation in speech. Sonn wrote memo about 2-3 in the morning. But "speech was already written."

Sieverts: this was Hilsman's hobby horse. He had pushed, then and later, on notions that: a) this would broaden options, lay groundwork for later actions to get rid of Castro (which ICR thought should be pushed); b) this would give Khrushchev an opportunity to shove blame onto Castro and abandon him, along with missiles.

Sonn: as it worked out, it was a greater defeat for Khrushchev, so probably just as well. Baraz: probably wouldn't have made much difference.

((But why was notion dropped of including Castro, or even of focussing on him? Sieverts: Intelligence was determining--it indicated more and more clearly that this was purely a Russian undertaking, operation. But that didn't mean a) Castro hadn't invited it; b) we shouldn't seize opportunity to blame Castro. Who/why/when was opposition to this?))

(note: Carter was acting DCI while McC away)

General belief in intell. commun that SU wouldn't put missiles; SNIE except for McC in CIA ((when did he start? prior to SAMs?)) and a group with Nigro (?) in DIA; because it was so uncharacteristic.

Baraz: combination of feelings that it was "too different" and "too risky" for Sovs; he knew of no individual who held one view without the other (e.g., "it's not the sort of stupid, reckless thing they usually do").

(Did this reflect feeling that (a) if US did take local action beyond blockade, SU would be in bad spot? and (b) they would have to give some attention to that? But maybe (Southard, Munson) they gave very little prob to that; or (Sonn) they regarded that as possible but "less likely," and as ~~xxx~~ with some other bureaucracies, contingency of less likelihood got virtually no attention.))

Various reasons for not expecting: for surprise:

- 1) "It's too different."
- 2) "It's too dangerous."
- 3) "It's too mean." (Thompson; JFK? Rusk? Growing hopes of understanding; "dialog" with Gromyko in New York on non-dissemination, Berlin, test ban; hopeful. ((So, pressures for action may have been seen as jeopardizing that dialog; as would a U-2 incident?))

Note feeling on 28 Oct, virtually unanimous in State and WH: there must be no gloating, don't rub it in, hurt K's position; and (b) now that K has looked close at nuclear war, there is a chance for real progress: he will never try such a thing again. The belief that he has learned make it unnecessary for us to learn, i.e., to modify the expectations that made his act a surprise for us.



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.


DJSM-633-64
11 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SIOP Access

Reference: Office of the Secretary of Defense Memo
I-5160/64, dated 3 April 1964

In response to the referenced memorandum, Mr.
John T. McNaughton and Mr. Daniel Ellsberg have been
placed on the Master SIOP Access List at the Office of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Code 1 (complete) SIOP
access.


J. W. DAVIS
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director

April 25, 1962

1962 Cuba Quarantine Criticized and Defended at Law Barley

By ANTHONY LEWIS
Special to the New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25 -- Last fall's quarantine of Cuba was praised and denounced today at a meeting of the American Society of International Law.

Prof. Quincy Wright of Columbia University was the principal critic. He said President Kennedy's move to force removal of Soviet missiles had been "an illegal and dangerous unilateral action."

"By the quarantine," Professor Wright said, "the United States resorted to forcible action that cannot be justified with our obligations under the United Nations Charter. You cannot reconcile the position we took with the obligation to settle all disputes by peaceful means."

Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, said the quarantine was not a "legal issue" at all in the way that phrase should be understood.

Issue Held 'Above Law'

"In our system," he said, "the survival of states is above law--it must be."

Mr. Acheson suggested that no lawyer could really have said, in October, whether the quarantine was "legal" or "illegal." The law, he said, simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power--power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty.

As a historical example he mentioned the refusal of the Court of King's Bench in the 14th Century to pass on the validity of the Duke of York's claim to the English Crown. The question was too much one of power, not of principle.

"It is harmful to believe," Mr. Acheson said, "that nations have accepted restraints on their sovereign power that prevent them from saving a way of life that respects law."

"I cannot believe that there are principles of law that say we must accept destruction of our way of life--I just cannot believe it."

Mr. Acheson said international law did play a part in the Cuban quarantine strategy and development --the important procedural role that law often plays.

Legal considerations were involved in the steps for approval of the quarantine by the Organization of American States. Legal avenues, Mr. Acheson said, permitted wise delay and consideration of the views of other governments.

Abram J. Chayes, legal adviser of the State Department, said "law was an important consideration" in the quarantine decision. The long-run goals of the United States, he said, would have been damaged by a cynical disregard for law.

Mr. Chayes asserted that the quarantine was sustainable under established principles of international law. He relied primarily, as Governments of officials have in comments since the episode, on the authorization of the O.A.S.

However, Mr. Chayes, like Mr. Acheson, declared that it was foolish to ask such questions as, "Was the quarantine legal?" He said the first year of law school was supposed to teach lawyers not to ask generalized questions like that.

In domestic law, Mr. Chayes said, the whole effect of the judicial system is to refine and focus questions and get away from such abstractions. Since international law has no effective judicial remedies in most cases, he continued, it is up to international lawyers to do the refining and focusing--not "to deal at large with such deep policy questions."

Professor Wright accepted Mr. Chayes' contention that the vote of the Organization of American States authorized action against Cuba herself, since Cuba was a signatory to the O.A.S. treaty. But he said it was not a basis for action against ships of a third party, the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chayen contended that this approach produced the absurd result that it would be "illegal" to block Soviet ships en route to Cuba but "legal" to bomb anything in Cuba, or her territorial waters, including Soviet ships.

The U-2 and the Cuban Crisis

collateral.

1. Negative evidence on agent reports (spring 1962).
 2. Negative on ~~buildup~~ missile reports, 5 Aug. (and on buildup?)
 3. Positive on SAMs, negative on MRBMs, 29 Aug and 4 Sept.
 4. Alleged: McN, JFK relied heavily on photos, little on reports ("not evidence").
 5. 30 Aug ~~and~~; U-2 overflight of Sakhalin; Sept 8, U-2 shot down over China; 2 31 Aug, 7 Sept evidence of SAMs, no evidence of MRBMs---planned flight Sept 10 cancelled (why?): meeting of Sept 10.
- a) sensitivity to incidents; b) little prob of MRBMs: 1) no evidence (assumption that they couldn't appear soon?), plus evidence of SAMs with which to discount agent reports; 3) expert disbelief (ONE, except for McC);
h) political disbelief (especially, wishfully, after we had announced?)
c) appearance of SAMs (especially in area where reports indicated possible site).

This led to desire

Korner, 27 March 64

On communication between Allies:

On Cyprus, our interests were not identical with British. But we had a good plan; which was held up for 10(?) days because we had failed to communicate with British, "educate" them (to a degree that was possible despite some difference in interest). Simply didn't get around to it? (British wouldn't accept, or had plan of their own?)

1964

$$630 \times 11 = 6930$$

$$180 \times 13 = 2340$$

$$\underline{7970}$$

$$(15,000) \\ 17,427$$

$$MM 600 \times 1.1 = 660$$

$$288 \times 1 = 288$$

$$126 \times 4.5 = 567$$

$$108 \times 9 = 972$$

$$\underline{10,397}$$

$$2927$$

1972

$$1000 \times 1.1 = 1100$$

$$656 \times 1.4 = 918.4$$

$$\underline{1756}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 10,397 \overline{) 17560} \\ \underline{10397} \\ 7163 \end{array}$$

79.5%

1972

1964

$$222.6 / 11340$$

$$4275 / 13050$$

$$\underline{114 / 11340}$$

$$\underline{2134 / 13050}$$

$$2185 / 4343$$

$$2443 / 2714$$

630

11

630

11

630

87

3

240

108

1040

4.5

126

270

90

45

567.0

108

9

972

1961

1961

63

64

2191/3297

2072/5110

2072/5110

1961

102

72

398/337

495/980

2972/6154

209/293

212/354

557/630

557/326

Under (5592/20882)
(251.202)

(5170/10963)

8th

63

64

5238/14515

5713/15769

(2 4275/13050)
min 1443/2714

65

66

1964

6592/14458

5357/12777

1027/2396

426/985

154/2051

67

5536/11972

5011/11453

(3451/8890)
(2135/3081)

(5226/11340)
5125/45143

(8192/333575)

Rates projected 25% drop from

1961 to 1963 (actual about 40%)

Good

73

B-52 approach + TEG

630

JCS

B-47 (200-205, and in 66)

SS approach + TEG

66

JCS

62

AMSA CSAP

71
15

105

Atlas JCS

72

(down from 125 in 64)

TIG

0 (and in 68)

Station

54

TEG

(down from 108 in 64 to 54 in 65)

MM I approach

72
400

73

JCS

100

TEG

?

SS 1 111-70

MM II approach

300

1500

CSAP

1500

1500

1200

1500

1200

1500

((Several days before the 15th, N. was convinced by a briefing by a Navy captain in DIA that the Sovs were probably putting in offensive missiles in Cuba; he informed _____ of his conviction. Later, X asked him, "How did you know, before everyone else?" Others found their skepticism dissolving, but they didn't share N's conviction. However, even for N, "A certainty is very different from a high probability."

N was at State with R in dinner with Shroeder when Hilsman called R. They were in the midst of a discussion of Cuba. R came back very pale. After dinner, he took N out on terrace and told him. They discussed alternatives. N had already thought about problem, concluded that invasion looked very bad--would be a bloody mess--and that air strike looked better; but that too, at that moment, didn't look good (especially a surprise attack, with political repercussions) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ He didn't immediately consider blockade. He thought we would just have to eat it. R felt about the same way. (He wouldn't necessarily have predicted this reaction). Both agreed, it was a hideous prospect. (N also worried about military/strategic aspects; the short warning times, Southern route. He was probably one of the few to take this seriously).

Early the next morning N had to go to give a speech, by plane; he missed first discussions; but starting from 17th, was in every discussion. Invasion: McCone, Dillon, Lemay (preceded by large air strike). Blockade followed by air strike (at first, preceded by declaration of war): Nitze, McNamara. (Who for surprise strike? Ball? JFK? Bundy? Who for eating it: Gil?)

"The way that an ultimatum comes to be considered is that plans for action are developed, then decision-maker comes to look for some alternative to having to use them; he decides to try warning.

State may come in early with a proposal for warning, 80% likely to work; but DOD worries about the military consequences of that 20% chance of having to carry out (and DOD may neglect the political consequences of carrying out threat, which State deals with).

(This seems to be the way the direct threat was actually generated; at the point when plans for air strike had been generated and ExComm was ready to use them "if necessary," yet was repelled enough by prospect to try direct approach to avoid it: despite the risks of that approach (K commitments, threats to US, public and allies, allied pressures) which had deterred it earlier.) (Pressure to make actual military strike a "fait accompli," rather than encourage opponent and allies to try to influence one.)

1st meeting at State 17 Oct

Ball: treat this as a sort of U2 incident. Must have occurred as a mistake, or unauthorized. Extremely limited air strike. Announce that flying in direct contradiction on what he promised. A summit.

McN: No meeting with Pres until tomorrow morning. Address ourselves to alternatives. Reduce to writing for afternoon. Meet again this evening.
1. Facts. 2. Alternatives. 3. Systematic review of consequences.

McC: What we see today is only phase 1 of ultimate objective. Base policy on pro

...three sites MRBM, ...no knowledge of where warheads are. Unexplained construction in very large cave 5 miles to west of site. Useless with conventional warheads. Reckless to assume no atomic warheads. Atomic bombs for 21s and IL28?

5. Have in port series of ships in port with 63 boxes, not like any we have ever seen. 20 ships on way, 8 of which can carry weapons.
7. Area near Havana could be proper for warhead. Secure underground installation.

McB: Major Soviet base, not support of Castro, major threat against US.

Thomp: Could be bargaining point Turkey.

McB: Could be persuaded not to use (?)

McC: Not Turkey. (?)

Soviet intentions:

- McC: 1) Provide C. retaliation
2) Attack against US
3) Hallmarks of accomplishment; show what Soviets
4) Political trading

Tay: Gambit to get us involved.

When decision made: June, July.

Thomp: Wants a showdown with best chance of coming out with Berlin, bases, disarmament. We jumped gun by finding out.

Decision made prior to Pres public statement. Would he deny or defend?

Alternatives:

((WHO?))

1. How many sorties. May be on low side.

a. MRBMs 4 area, 23 targets; 75 large bombs, 52 sorties, low level.

b. plus airfield plus IL28 crates: 100 sorties

c. plus SAM sites and air capable targets, 51 areas: 200 sorties, 350-400 large weapons.

d. plus significant military, not pre-invasion: 500
1 day.

e. plus invasion, 1400 targets; 4000 weapons, 2000 sorties. Several days.
None include forces threatening Guantanamo.

2.

1. Blockade. Worst form. divisive, involves allies.

Action taken concurrently: call for summit. Expecting response against vulnerable..

Alternatives:

Ball: I. Limited immediate action. announced low level surveillance.

Guilty of action contrary to what have said.

Deflecting world by putting in political context.

If he accepts we move from strength.

Bilateral summit?

II. a. Start with political. This stops mil.

b. Start with blockade, and surveillance.

Say we not going to ~~Polymultitatum~~

Poli ultimatum

Could K. maintain himself if he did not respond. Attacks Turkish weapons least he could do.

Martin: If in 5 days they don't remove we would invade. Faces K with no out.

Johnson: emissary to Castro. Get rid or we are going to attack. Treat as a Castro, not Soviet problem. Has to accept OAS team.

A.G.: Why is Castro going to accept.

Thomp: See whether he will break with Soviets.

Johnson: Limit it to offensive weapons.

Taylor: Why don't we relax about it. Accept it as another target.

McN: Political approach will stop mil. action.

Martin: If not backed up with mil. pol. ineffective.

McN: No mil threat justifying response. What is minimum response.

Blockade plus surveillance

Search and inspection of Soviet ships.

Removal.

McN. Variant. Surveillance. Will attack Soviet Union if preparation to launch against US.

Ball: Any further action to make operational we will act. How do we act..

Taylor: No intermediate position. Accept or don't accept these missile bases.

A.G. Give nucs to Germans. They wouldn't.

3. What alternatives.

A.G. Every action unpleasant to K.
should be surveilled by State

Surveillance

Take out if against L.A. or US

Open statement to take care of domestic

How important to let him off hook

Pull women and children out of Moscos and satellites.

I Pol

II Minimum to meet domestic and L.A.

III Military ~~but~~ alternatives.

Threat to Carib area.

Political action will lose surprise. If you lose surprise then..

I (a) 50 targets. leave Castro with wound.

Taylor: Minimum air attack on US?

Ultimatum concurrently with strike.

Can't guarantee

N. Offensive weapons as sole objective.

Johnson: Buy off

restore relations

Can you stop ~~at~~ after 50 sorties or 400 sorties without invasion.

R: Congress called to recognize a state of war

To emphasize difference between this action and war.

Division of 2 alliances

NATO most

Bring about fall

Threats to: Berlin, Iran, Turkey, Quemoy-Matsu, Korea, Pakistan,
Finland?

Disarray in alliance

Depends on prior preparation. Consultation. Advance notice. Opportunity
to get out by ad. notice.

Oct. 18, White House

R. Is it necessary to take action.

No action, would underline to allies

a) grd to grd, gravest issues would arise

b) effect on Sovs. If we unable, greatly increase their confidence.

c) Gravest problem internally.

Action serious risks. Counteraction probably heavier. Reaction Korea to Berlin to US.

To spread from 50/60 strikes would increase problem.

Unannounced unconsulted could have serious repercussions.

Different than Suez.

If we enter upon this path. No one can surely foresee the outcome.

Even without new info, probably result in great

Am. people willing to much. If good conscience. Theory of the case.

Guns of August. Is trip necessary. WWII clear. Korean got into considerable trouble. Militate in favor of consultationx K and invocation Rio.

1st. K might back down

2d. Rio Pact strongest position, other declaration of war.

Further info, dec. of national importance and declaration of war, maybe best course. Larger problem. Larger way.

Alternative short strike. Larger problem, challenge goes up a great deal.

Bohlen: Existence can't be tolerated.

Two means, diplomatic or military.

If determination firm, no danger.

Tone and tenor important.

Strike will lead to go. war. Allied reaction dead against us.

Declaration invaluable.

Limited quick action illusory.

McN: Assume no nuclears. I or II (Page 1?) inconclusive, costs not worth. ((I think: I, MRBMs, II plus airfields, II28s, III plus SAMs and air capable targets, IV plus significant military.))

II better than I. More sorties now necessary. Would verge into III.

Taylor: II would require III, SAM sites. Still require for surveillance. III could be done in a day. At end AF nearly destroyed.

McN: Evaded R's question. How does it change military balance. Not at all. Chiefs others don't agree. Pol. problem. Conditioning K, allies.

H: Whatever action going to cause lots of people to think mad.

5.

T. Energy with which moving. Any time operational. I128-- now ideal time-- Mobile
can't take out this threat from air. Can't prevent progress. Takes dip or invasion. As to mobile, it may be already too late.

McC: Now not Soviet. Not members Warsaw Pact. Sovs might have way to back out.

H: K's reply Berlin, Turkey, Italy.

^{Speaker} T: ((air strike?)) Kill Russians. Prefers blockade, surveillance, legality,

R: Our action aimed at Cuba.

^{Speaker} T: can assume he will want to talk. Will be negotiative.

A.G. He blockade Berlin
tradeoff.

McC: Eisenhowers pts: missiles' intolerable
Limited raise doubts in rest of world
Go to jugular. Havana.
Minimum loss of life.

R. Will need national emergency or declaration of war.

Th: M and Castro has to go.
Bertr from blockade.

Dillon: What could K do that would satisfy us.

Th: Most is to say won't do any more, we can check

Th: British would want us to have told K

Ball: If he did it after fait accompli, are you better off

McC: K can't believe we don't know. He would lock us into negotiation.

H: Only out give up Turkey base.

McN: Several hundred Russians killed. Strong r  poste.

Ball: Difficult to overestimate impact of no warning politically.

Th: Precipitate real Berlin crisis.

H: does he invade or blockade.

N: blockade.

H: How about declaration of war. Then you have to invade.

B. If not act of hostility against everyone else.

Mex, Bol, Brazil, Ecuador?

B. Blockade without ultimatum, impossible situation with rocketry.

Th. Posture, if things stop we don't act.

B. If K recognizes C. lost

R. A little more time, something may crack.

H. If he responds, giving us an ultimatum, are we worse off.

A.G. Would anyway take 7 days. Could always hold out.

H. Cruisers return fire.

McN: split into 2 course

1. Slow: Pol plus blockade

2. Fast: Notify plus military action and blockade

Taylor: Monday--better--Tuesday best--Saturday possible.

McN Intell better by Friday.

McN: Two groups. basic alternatives. Minimum action forceful action.
How Sovs and others response. Air Blockade without strike.
 don't kill Cubans or Russians
 might get deal
~~xixvaxim~~ let him continue to build.

Ball: recognition of state of war. The Pres would ask Congress to recognize (or Pres declare pursuant to resolution).

7. Oct. 18, State

Eisenhower. No surprise. Thought offensive buildup would occur.
Expressed criticism of handling. Present situation
would prove to be intolerable. Discussinss of no avail.
Blockade, difficult when stopped. Capt. refused. Bring
to Port.
Limited, indecisive, irritating to world opinion. Great
fear in all areas where Sovs could respond. Turkey, Pakistan.
Korean analogy. 4th day Truman reversed.
Leaned to military action to cut off Havana. Such a plan
more decisive than landing and slow type invasion.

Cuban deployed forces. 19000 in 25 miles, ~~221~~ 31,000 in 50
50,000 in 100 miles.

BSH

Bohlen: Exchange with Castro, K
Notification to MacM, NATO, OAS and Turks
Then strike limited to offensives
If strike without notice, unpredictable results.

May be pushing to see how far they can go. Get 50 sites. real accretion.
Lenin dictum: must advance, still withdraw.

Rusk: OAS. Not too much difficulty in getting 2/3 d's for declaration
the threat to Hemisphere. Will take 2 or 3 days get action in OAS.

R: Congress state of war directed specifically against these missiles.
Simultaneously in Oas etc. Cut through mass of legalities.

Objection to talking.

McN: they can be redeployed.

A.G. We don't know now that some aren't hidden and operational now.

Option I: only one politically possible without notice to allies.

Rusk: Send private C and K. Give them last clear chance.

Acheson: If you do this ball it all up. Counter-ultimatum. Must act
at once.

1. Do it with no talk.

Some response

Plan

Berlin, Korea, Turkey, Quemoy, Japan.

2. Alert every one on short time basis, fully and persuasively.

NATO-OAS by high level people.

Former Pres.

3. Fly over air borne division to Europe.

4. Shouldn't worry about election.

5. Wise Pres cancel campaign speeches.

Take it much better than anyone would suspect.
Pleasure we do act.

2. Thursday, Oct 15, White House

- McN: 1. Pol discussion, no mil.
2. Blockade, concurrent Pol.
3. air strike, concurrent Pol.

Blockade more under control. Otherwise set if up for K. Broken alliances.
Lost Berlin. Excessive price.

McB. Gravest issues. Intolerable to usx We endure, every day. Too much self respect to respond by act of aggression. Soviet held to account.
Creates situation can regard Cuba only as pawn. Responsibility of USSR
Invite K to come at once. Larger issue is freedom. Don't provoke to pull fabric apart. Hazard in Berlin.

T. Better if we don't hesitate. Look at what happens if we don't act.

McC. Better risk with action than none.

McN. Must act. But act so we maintain control of events. While would like to take out, but leads to unpredictable response

Offensive weapons blockade

Can tighten as we go along. Might have allies.

Intolerable condition. Don't say what we will do.

Low level pictures.

48 hours partially effective blockade

McB Why do we need to hasten on blockade. Pres statement. announce what we will do. Sunday night. Pictures.

OAS-- Acheson go to NATO and governments. Personal emissaries, Italy England, Turkey. Pictures

1030 at State.

Martin: How can Pres do this without declaration of war.

Stevenson down tomorrow.

Description of blockade--not to bring down Cuba. Offensive weapons-- with or without POL. Priority to Soviet. board. get instructions from State. perfunctory stop others.

3.

Assert from Madison and Monroe....

A.G. Three or four alternatives

a. Letters to K and Castro

Estimated response

Then what happens

Go to OAS, UN

b. Military action initially. 50 or 200, results around world.
What Russians would do. War. Turkey.

c. Military action after letters

d. Blockade, declaration of war, after preliminary steps

3. McC8s invasion

Oct 18 afternoon

Rusk: Cannot accept operational MRBMs. On both political and military grounds. Pres has said grd to grd raises most serious set of problems. Would invite most serious exchanges, commit Soviets, talk while more erected.

Suggests Tuesday inform certain key allies, Mac deG, Adn, possibly the Turks. Possibly L.A. 45 Pres.

Along about Wed strike these missiles. Simultaneously, public statement K, telling. Same time OAS, SC, NATO Council. Got this strike over with.

If attack in Korea, meet. Berlin, we ~~must~~ know what to do. Q.M. not likely.

In out public statement, accompanying, any kind of counter-actionxxf against U.S.--condition of war. Surveillance of Cuba.

UN..we will get into overseas bases. Turn into Geneva type.

US allies in general encouraged by show of firmness. India, etc. probably somewhat restrained. We cast blank checks in that situation. Want and demand their support

Critical is what we should say to Russians, and in public announcement. If we can handle as first step, take out missiles. Won't such problem. Lots of subsequent decisions.

Otherwise will go down with a whimper. May be better with bang.

In opening statement cover, Intolerable, continue to take whatever action necessary.

Not just actual effect, but also what we have declared.

Not too concerned about argument about Turkey.

Have record of whole post-war period. International law reflection of US policy in this Hemisphere. May have dialectical argument. Depends on who prepared stare who down.

Problem of danger to Venezuela, etc. No good knocking out 16 missiles lose 3 countries.

McN: How assure Castro and commanders truly understand your message.

R: Put message in Swiss hands. Talking about 50 strike plan.

McN: Migs flushed. Temptation attack Guantanamo. Put 400 planes including strike over Cuba.

R: Big strike destroys political effect of limited attacks.

McB: Principle that sensitive areas not to be turned into nuclear bases. Be lin, Iran, Laos. In all three we have been willing to see undertakings that they not be so stationed. Italy-Turkey to be equated with NATO; clear democratic majorities supported our being invited to do this because of direct Soviet threat. Might be end of Morocco, Wheelus. New regime on bases we can live with.

Not a Pearl Harbor. xMzk

11. State Dept, AM, Friday Oct 19

Friday, Oct 19

McC briefing. NIE. Grymyko.

Johnson: Doesn't see problem in establishing. Must get OAS ratification. UN can get jurisdiction. Problem to maintain legality. Declaration of war not required. All inclusive vs. selective. Prize court. Normally wartime, status of war. Any state has right to preserve status quo if promptly taken to multilateral. Else Art. 51, self defense measure.

Mecker:

Declaration of war not only not necessary but would get us into additional problems both under international law and under charter. Present situation not one of armed attack or imminent armed attack. Leaves question of whether we justified in preventing further shipments. Under international law and treaties not entitled to use force unless we procure measure voted by OAS. Can argue special regime of law under which we have rights other countries don't have. If we take action first then go to L.A. govs. Couldn't get others to go along. Could announce that we are planning to go to OAS.

Problem is to maintain and convince we are legal. Need decision under 6 and 8. Then in legal and practical position to fend off attacks in Sec Council. Better position than if we claim right to act.

Martin: 14 needed. Uruguay, Mex, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile marginal. Legally would we refer to it as defensive quarantine.

Acheson:

If discussion meant merely quarantine means nothing at all. Risks security of country for legal formalities? Any who wants to understand can understand. Depends on what it is you want to do. ((Security jeopardized how? Defiance; humiliation; effect on expectations of Soviets crucial; and to this, our warnings, predictions, and change of status quo crucial.)) ((Similar issues in Suez: Nasser vs. British.)) ((Some military/strategic impact could be claimed there.

my Dillon agrees.

McN:

- 1) Pure political moves
- 2) Immediate stop import, ultimately complete
- 3) Full strike against dangerous forces. 300-400 sorties against Russian 200 against forces ringing Guantanamo.

Pres. tentative decision Sunday; blockade Monday.

McB disturbed,

Alternating between enough or nothing.

Taylor:

McN: Need to think of time. Can't announce blockade Sunday night. Air strike. Chiefs prefer Monday or Tuesday. need 24 hours notice.

Sorenson: Concern that decision had become unstuck. Feels time is of the essence.

12.

Mecker: Who gov in power after strike?

Rusk:

Need two courses of action

Chiefs--McCone--Dillon--McBundy ((air strike?))

McN--AG--Ball-- blockade.

Difficulty, Pearl Harbor.

Living under gun

Analyze fact coldly just as

Show down better now

but perhaps not

Thompson: Clear that we are heading for a showdown. Getting into area where surprise attack.

Acheson: Either decision very hard. If you are having showdown must run into these dangers.

Weapons in Siberia not as dangerous as in Cuba is false.

Why are we interested

If blockade then you can take out

Has indicated can pull tail feathers out of eagle

This is the moment, won't come again.

Prepare him as best we can.

All elements have been brought out.

Get him ready for the decision.

Detailed scenario. Telegrams, whole works.

Afternoon, Friday 19

Mecker: Art 53 provides Sec Council must authorize enforcement action by regional group. We might have seven votes in favor position that not enforcement action. Rio Treaty states use of armed force not obligatory. Not order, preventing arrival. Obvious answer is votes.

Rusk: Shouldn't we ourselves inform Sec Council pursuant to art 54. Got it out of UN in general assembly. Sec Gen in direct touch how to get timing settled. Do at same time as you go to OAS. Do it that night, asking meeting next morning. Soviet Pres.

A.G. Question of whether you could announce surveillance and if they continue to make offensive. Question of whether or not to put in responsibility of Soviets.

McN Is objective of policy including blockade to secure removal of missiles.

Rusk: Hopefully followed by other steps which would give us possibility of taking them

McN: Either we blockade and accept the missiles or we eventually take them out.

McB: Don't announce invasion. Concentrating on missiles will have same effect.

13.

McN. Our intention at start is important. Blockade route, some degree of vagueness as to how. Eventually you bargain away something else and come out with missiles out.

Dillon: Can you go on for more than week.

Thompson: Soviets will keep control. Possibility of loss of control. But we can play same game. Strength of your position is that eventually you will knock them out.

Sorenson: Blockade go on until missiles out.

Taylor: Internal decision to go forward with maximum preparations.

Rusk: If you take this step we will pull out of Berlin: Macmillan, de Gaulle?

Gaylor: If alliance is going to break up, it will.

Rusk: Just wanted to mention.

State Department, PM, night of 19 Oct Rusk

Start with blockade. If not observed by Soviets Hit.

- 1) Preemptive strike on their power
- 2) No question, if lots of Russians killed, will take forceful action.
Turks, Italians
Attacks on missile bases, or threat unless withdraw.
- 3) Berlin
- 4) Conference on peace treaty
- 5) Pakistan or Iran
- 6) Macmillan agree, at least until women evacuated.
No Polarises in England or Germany.
- 7) UN

Johnson--Nitze, night of Oct 19

Assume blockade instituted after: a) announcement to public; b) declaration of war; c) unsuccessful communication to K and/or C.

I. Limited blockade, only against offensive weapons, directed to immediate threat, grd to grd missiles, combat aircraft. What's necessary to make work. Objective not bringing down Castro but offensive threat.

- 1) Soviets acquiesce--what does this mean. (Problems of subs and planes?)
Would anything less than inspection of cargos be acceptable? No.
Requires stopping and boarding or being willing to turn around.
- 2) Probability of Sov acquiescence? High but not certain.

14.

What ripostes available to them, assuming acquiescence.

a) Comparable action re Berlin ineffective. Therefore they would have to take non-comparable action which could include, denial of access to Berlin by American forces. Of little effect if only on ground but could be significant if air access blocked. Would claim of equivalent effect.

They could stop all Allied military access, or impose full blockade of Berlin. Our riposte, full blockade of Cuba and/or execution contingency plans for Berlin. Question, would it not be better to separate Berlin and Cuba and respond by action in Berlin on Berlin, not combined basis. But K may link.

Damage to Commies is largely failure to back Castro. He would have to offset this.

(Does blockade make Berlin blockade more likely. This relates to limited indirect approach versus direct approach. Limited may help with Allies. May encourage K to 2 eyes for an eye approach.

b) Exercise maximum of their capabilities to bring about overthrow of Venezuela, Bolivia, Guantanamo, Ecuador, Dominican governments and substitution of United Front governments. Chance of success less under this assumption than under assumption broader or more direct action ...

c) World wide or local blockade against US shipments of offensive weapons systems to overseas bases. Our riposte would be to declare it an illegal blockade. (Few windows left in any US embassies. Campaigning against US overseas bases.)

d) Takeover Laos. Not likely under this hypothesis.

e) Encourage or permit Castro to use declaration of war as the peg on which to bring actions forcing us to more forceful measures. This depends on whether K wants us to invade Cuba. If provocation obvious allies will have more sympathy to our invasion but in long run US position could suffer.

General comments on this alternative

a) This alternative does not weaken Castro economically and therefore may need to extend...

b) Does not get rid of offensive systems now there. Warheads can be brought in by air, if not already there.

c) Talks and diplomatic activity will be goingblockade.

d) Low level air cover during blockade would mean loss of prestige for Castro. High level flights would not falter our penetration as directly.

e) Castro attacks on Guantanamo less likely if blockade limited and Sovs acquiesce. Castro attacks with Komars similar. Although, legally no objection.

2. Soviets do not acquiesce. a. What do they do locally. Cuban Komars? Russian subs. Planes from Cuba. Self defense of merchant men. Conroy. Not effective, but might lead to Russian loss of life.

b. Campaign in Security Council. At minimum, veto. At max, votes to defeat.

Add on statement that any further work on deployment offensive systems most serious consequences.

Then if he doesn't stop a week or two later we hit them.

But may we not be tangled up in negotiation.

We can add to pressure by expanding blockade.

We can also have worldwide blockade of USSR or NATO economic embargo.

In Phase II of contingency plans with pretty full mobilization.

During night, Oct 20, 1956

Oct 20, Saturday

2nd State? (See memo by J. C. 10/20/56, during night, with Gher, 72, Smith.)

Nuc stor under construction at IRBMs

TU 114 Dakar could be carrying ... unusual plane

Poltava due Nov 2 80 ft.

Rusk: UN send group to all missile sites in world
Bring to Port the Polaris.

S: Need some major political initiative.

N: 10% accept 40% reject 50% counteroffer. ((problem of SU response?))

S: Are we prepared to do.

Thompson: Sovietest wouldn't consider for a moment elimination without removal what we have in Europe.

S. Open door to whole series of negotiations.

Bc Make offer to K to join us in making such

R: assignments: Blockade in Pent: Anderson, Sharp, McNaughton
Taylor--Air Strike
Johnson--messages
McB-- strike
preliminary to K and C
tomorrow

Significant civil measures. No.

McC: Check readiness of missiles.
Pres here at 2:30.

Dillon: Is speech intended to lead to long course, or short. If latter change to

Ball: Transition from one to other.

A.G. Exclude strike if blockade.

McN: No commitment. Begin blockade. can't do

16.

Oct 20, Saturday, White House, 2:30

Briefing. 4 maybe 5 X 4 MRFM
2 X 4 IRBM 16 weeks

Poltava 10 days

18 hours to ready. Mobil--to pre-surveyed sites. Can move away in minutes.

McN: 2 tracks. Blockade--supplement? By surveillance? military action?
negotiation? Ted speech thing to look at.
Removal might require Guantanamo, Jpeters, etc to be paid.

Ultimatum re subsequent strike unwise. Conditioning might reduce risk. Expand
mil. action hot pursuit, anti-SAM, ~~mt~~ economic strangulation might get
missiles out.

NIE Sovs. Concentrate on Pol. not forceful. Disadvantages. Long time.
Domestic. Strains on NATO. Negotiations against background weaker than had
appeared. Further military action might be required at worse time for us.
Least chance of allies.

((blockade?)) Avoid Pearl Harbor. Only course compatible with principles. Avoids
attack against potentially operational missiles. Avoids sudden military
move so forcefully that we quickly escalate.
Recommends blockade route.

P: Knew July, we would have blockaded. Same reasons then as now restrained us.
Deal with missiles that are there.

T. Danger of lanyard pulling ~~mt~~ slight. Piecemeal commitment unwise.

Taylor: We don't know how to put in air blockade.

McN: I would recommend we shoot them down if they think they carry warheads.

A.G. Great point that from now Castro will be able do whatever he wants. Living
with nuclear threat forever.

Taylor: From then on shoot 100 ...a day with impunity.

Who for what. McB, Taylor, Dillon, McC and Chiefs with variations

P. Whatever we do all for it.
How successful can strike be.

T. Would hope 100% of those now identified.
McC 2/3 ...of mobile. Continue closest air surveillance.

T. Maximum chance against airplanes now.

R. Could they be decoys? B: Potemkin village. McB: not likely.
P: Planes don't bother. Have been living with that. Planes don't have
political impact.

17.

A.G. Possibility of blockade and 1 day. How will scatter his planes. Deploy.

McB Counterthreats.

McC Two routes can be merged. Don't like P.H. Demand.

D. Lose L.A. Must remove. Better with blockade, dismantle, inspection. 72 hours or perhaps more difficult. If Mc M. decision rt. then straight strike.

(Alpatric)

R.G. Chiefs plan 800 sorties. To initiate this kind of force is not kind we can take. Blockade.

McN: 800 plus 250 to support Guantanamo. Can't stop with this. Gov in chaotic state. Must think of accompanying with invasion. Inconceivable that Soviets will respond and then we respond. Leads to unpredictable but probable heavy

P. Chiefs ~~plan~~ plan not surgical. Apt to grab.

Start with blockade, work cease, planes not uncrated. Can't be screwing about Italy or Turkey. Take out if the issue. K makes speech. pay no attention. Berlin--be prepared for. Will be reprisal. Continue to uncrate--Monday, Tuesday. Can we tell. Move trailers into woods. Can we see. By Thursday might have in woods.

Dillon: Inspection?

R. Do you publish pictures

P. Only thing is missiles. Don't care about planes.

T. Migs and SAMS.

A.G. Not overwhelming.

R. Would recommend you make decision in 2 chapters. Not effective consultation. No opportunity to reconsider. Doesn't foreclose. Grt. risks without compensation. Blockade not without risks.

Dillon: Reasonable low level surveillance., plus hot pursuit if attacked is something different.

McC: Warheads probably not there.

P. What defense against not in July.

B. Would have been in great trouble.

18.

R. Have been thinking. Observation teams to all countries to all except ...
having strategic nuclear missiles. Immediate freeze. Transparent.

P. Withdrawal of all missiles to home base?

R. 2d. Take note of security and put UN force in Cuba.

Stev: Gravest difficulties. Why we have bases, they can't. War fever.
Lose allies. Advantages in blockade. More likely OAS ~~approval~~ approval.
Object to eliminate without danger of escalation. Components of offer.
Observation teams. Guarantee of integrity. Withdrawal from Guantanamo,
All bases in context G.C.D. Caribbean defense treaty.

If no progress, substantive action. Hard to see where or how.

P. Can't give up Guantanamo at this point.
Missiles from foreign soil.

A.G. Give to Germany.

1. Prepare for first missiles
Evacuation Guantanamo.

T. Get in position for invasion. Yes.

Tell Turkey and Italy, not fire if attacked. Dismantle.
Low level photos.

I (N?) No prob. in invading. Give them excuse re Berlin. Probable we will
have to strike later in week.

1st just missiles now
" " 3 or 4 days

Missiles, planes, equipment, POL. This distinguishes between missile threat
and Castro.

P. 1st day? Technicians, can't do anything about.
P. Do this week. Quarantine.

P. Nuclear policy to France.
Command Post in McC's office.

Turks and Italians. Action against

Anderson's office command post Chayes-Meeker

Nitze note, Oct 20: I would follow the clockade route, accompanying it with an

19.

Nitze note, Oct 20:

I would follow the blockade route, accompanying it with an offer of a political plan in UN. If, in two or three days, we had continuing evidence of progress in the construction of the missile bases, I would strike the minimum number of targets necessary to eliminate the main nuclear threat but with adequate force against each target.

I believe it highly unlikely that Soviets would strike SAC under conditions where SAC is fully alerted.

If the surviving Cuban missiles are used against the US I would invade Cuba, not use nuclears against Cuba. It might then, however, be necessary to make a purely compensatory attack against the USSR.

I do not believe effective action against missiles in Cuba complicates the Berlin problem. Our plans for Berlin all depend on the credibility of US firmness.

If we permit the Cuban missile affront to go unanswered in an effective way, I see no possibility of negotiations with Khrushchev except on his terms. In other words I believe we have accepted his version of Communist coexistence.

Bundy's Office

20.

Oct 21, Bundy's Office, 11 AM

Afternoon meeting. 1) Pres speech. 2) Sorenson will have 3d draft. Solid tomorrow. Preliminary statement.

Speech not sharply different

- Issues:
- 1) Invitation to Kh
 - 2) degree of coupling Berlin
 - 3) how specific on character of offensive threat
pt. of our lack of knowledge. full disclosure?
 - 4) other people should not be in
 - 5) no bases in Cuba
 - 6) quarantine blockade
 - 7) clarity or ambiguity of OAS, period of grace

interrelation between dip. and action scenarios. Proclamation.

don't use A hour, P in all new paper.

3d item on agenda, mil. scenario; steps taken, steps to be taken.

how conducted. Non-vital, preferably the rudder. Boarding party.

Rules of engagement Cuban aircraft; attacking coast, 3 mile lim
in position attack US air or ships. SAM attack on surveillance--go after
SAM. air or ground fire on Guantanamo

Berlin--Should some one talk about Berlin--in Press conf or in speech

2d and 3d moves. Rostow back, Barthoff (Charyk)

22. Oct 22, 11AM Litze's office

Tactic of not demanding action of our allies, but instead indicating what we are prepared.

..Shouldn't throw past decisions to wind. Would give impression of panic. Soft pedal, predelegation, etc for the next few days.

Are there prompt actions which come to mind which would bolster alliance and or impress Soviets.

a) Evidences of allied solidarity. Some former restraints no longer necessary. Nuclear cooperation with French. French agreement. ((Pres?))

alerts

Additional deployment of nuclears to Europe. Fixed pit weapons.

Canada deployment of nucs. Merchant.

Holifield's concurrence

Approval on Bercon/Mercon

Deployment on additional divisions. Coupled with Allied action. JCS studying.

Publicly appear as

Subdelegate to Germans

Why didn't we consult: Without a first action, Sovs could have done all kinds of things. Their own security at stake. Couldn't afford to announce fact without an adequate action.

Norstad keep the wheel.

23. Oct 22, White House, 11:30 Cabinet Room

Personal message to commanders in Italy and Turkey. Send documents to Bundy.

White House, Oct 22, 3 PM NSC

Macmillan letter

Native resolution sickened over with pale cast of thought.

A.G. Illegal if we don't get OAS. Support of OAS essential. Get 14 votes. Nations aren't going to turn down lightly.

Hilsman: briefing. 24, 12. 4X4 in full operational 2X4 on 25th and 29th. mobile--might suddenly shift.

12 IREMs in Dec.

P. Feeling to reflect. Sing one song. Support the final action. No division. Every course taken, other would have been better. Eisenhower, Truman, Hoover.

Reasons against air strike:

- 1) Couldn't get all
No knowledge whether any in positions to be fired.
- 2) Know where 30 of 60 are.
Pearl Harbor, without consultation.

Don't know how to get them out. May be we going down course

Decided to do something because of commitment. Secret way. To do nothing, produce chance of Berlin.

Might face in Berlin in 3 months. Balance of power had shifted.

May have to invade. What are we going to do if U2 shot down. If work continues.

1 SAM or all. Meet tomorrow and decide.

No one thought nothing should be done.

Didn't give up on quick strike until Sunday, invasion required.

Have increased problem by warning.

Pearl Harbor would have excused very serious retaliation.

A.G.: 1st question. Why action not earlier. Quaint Quarantine in August. Couldn't have gotten 14 votes. In Europe viewed Berlin in jeopardy because of fixation on Cuba. Declaration of war in isolated position.

2d: surveillance until Tuesday. August 29--nothing there. Sept. we got suspicion. Cloud cover. 15 refugee reports. no confirmation. Meeting has basis. Probably didn't have. Sovietologists said no missiles.

23.

3d. May not hit. R. Obligation to OAS.

P. Wants everyone to understand.

4. What is distinction to Jupiters--

57 decision by NATO. In face of statement USSR. equipping, demand that Europe move.

Move taken secretly. Departure. No need Tass statement. Offensive in Cuba different.

Provocative change in delicate balance. Resulted from frustration about Berlin. Squirming about his commitment.

R. ...don't say we considered air attack. No alternative.

T. How about overt moves. Tell press. obviously taking precautionary moves. Not in public interest to ask about. Prepared for any eventuality. Not included in Pres policy. Voluntary censorship. Air-POL, matters not wise to comment on. Prepared to quarantine by whatever means if needed. Call up? Nat emergency. Keep under review from day to day.

Is this an act of war. Not of itself. Depends on intentions. Stop all ships.

Air action just Pearl Harbor. Invasion no orders.

(Unit morning: ships turned around, info)

25. Situation Room Oct 24 3 PM

Intercept--viat 6th fleet

a) advantages
dead seriousness
get look at hardware
you make them look ridiculous

b) disadvantages
British won't like it
rubbing it in, narrowing golden bridge of retreat
strains language

...
Rostow: signal seriousness. test of will and determination.
Importance to negotiations to have firm blockade.

~~xxxxxx~~
Oct 25, lunch with McN

Castro delivered Donovan list. 27% baby food. plasma 3 times annual requirement. Deal still considered as on. Great worry in Havana.

Rx

Oct 26, 10 AM, White House

Within Cuba, worry of invasion, bombing, or uprising. Sanchez expects to see prisoners.

A.G. Shouldn't indicate deal o ff. Donovan under control.

Dillon: Let's see whether we really want to go down this track. Might get wound up in spreading effects. Put confrontation on basis air action in Cuba. Don't confront Sovis at sea.

Cab measure progress. Announce we continue day and night. 10 right away. 4 at night. 10 flare per target.

R. On political side. Stevenson made Zorin look ridiculous.

....
Two other tracks. a) Encourage Brazilians to push hard for atom free L.A. Wouldn't involve Puerto Rico. Not transit. Could involve storage Panama. If you can get UN support. Give other side occasion for pulling back.

Taylor: Scepticism of effectiveness. Diversion of effortx from immediate. Africa, impact on de Gaulle. Algeria, not his test sties. Might tell him he could use our test sites.

Stev: ...2 week negotiation withdrawal from hemisphere
Now guarantee, the integrity of Cuba
Dismantling of Italy and Turkey
Defanging of Cuba from
Standstill not positive acts. 48 hours, Inoperable becomes meaningless.

26.

McCloy: Doesn't agree. Got momentum. Threat must be removed before.

P. Not going to get out by quarantine.

Bundy : must defuse.

R. Negative report every hour.

McCloy: must have our own inspectors.

P. What Gov's proposal is to negotiate them out.

P. Insist on defusing, by separation and inspectors. They won't accept.
Then decision on POL or

P. Do we put out work continuing. Comes out from W.H.

No night flight, tonight.

Ball, take chairmanship.

Oct 26, Ball's Office (or 27?)

Ball: Unless we can return to political arrangement we will all fry.
Need a bridge back.

Distinction between bombers and missiles. Important all the way around
If no IRBMs we would have ridden with it.

Thompson: If you leave bombers, K has an out.

Bundy: Remove just MRBMs. If any serious damage
CAS over air field

Military--plan
2 plans

10 sorties
500 sorties

1. missiles alone, with variants
2. general air strike
3. blockade.

Notify Soviets. Must take out. If attacked by air must take

1. Avoid, unpredictable, irrational, uncontrollable, response.

recon every 2 hours day and night.

3. do it with forces so limited that we can go back to negotiating table.

29.

27.

Bundy: Good political plan
 Assurances to Russians
 Assurances to Castro
 Assurances to Latinos
 Education of NATO

Grozny

If you strike you pass her. If not you should search. Hold

Post-strike problem

a) How we modify and limit Soviet action. Who should have communicated to whom. SAM sites must not be in party.

b) What preparations for other action.
military. proceed with negotiations. Posture in UN. They may get out.

1. Veto in S.C.
2. Strong interest
3. Refusal of U Thant track
4. Work continues
5. Some notice to USSR?
6. If any on launcher

R. Would have to consult some of our allies.

Progressive blockade.

Rowen, Kitchin, Thompson

Negotiating track, Henry Owen

23. Saturday, Oct 27, 10 AM White House ExComm

McN Communicate to U Thant that Grozny approaching. important

P. Turkish. Fact is that we received different

R. Turkish problem is problem between NATO and Warsaw Pact

Dillon: May be preparation for counter-action if we hit bases in Cuba.
Don't consider as an alternative.

R. If we publish this letter. What else previous letterx2

Bundy: Knock down publicly.
Makes private difficult.

A.G. Offered this deal. Withdraw. if assurances
always given ..

Bases in Cuba involve Hemisphere.

Time running out.

Excellent you brought up Turkey. Sure ~~xxxx~~ Turks and you withdraw.

N: First thing is have

Work must stop or we will not talk. Peril is he will say will do to
Turkey.

R: Turks should say part of of Western alliance and committed to NATO.
Withdraw warheads

Current threat to peace in Cuba. Not in Turkey. That is what has got
to stop.

If we take action makes more difficult move with world support.

Dillon: Dangerous sentence. means you consider aggressive.

Mc Stopped and operability defuzed.

P. How about Berlin

Dillon: affects security of Turkey, NATO and Berlin

1. Publicly knock down Turkish proposal.
2. Reinforce blockade.

no later 29th. Monday. not Tuesday

29.

Turkish one. Choice of bilateral. Or NATO. Explain to them. This problem, 6 hours. aftereffect.

McN: Do simultaneous. Get GRD up to it.

Are we going to send surveillance

a) with cover

b) without

Would like to have Turks and NATO agree this is the preferred course.

Have to make cessation of work. Then we can get on. Otheriwse he can tie us up.

Two plans: a) 1. Polaris off Turkish shores. Whether they attack or not, Turkey will be defended.

2. Plan of attack, conventional, against Russian warship, subx bases, NATO designed. But option for US alone.

312 ?

Oct 28, White House, 10 AM (not 27?) (27, 10 PM?)

T. A number of proposals have been made to you. Could you find out most urgently whether SU is prepared to immediately cease work on those bases and the missiles made inoperative while various solutions can be

NAC meeting ought to be called.

McN: Today, defusing Italian and Turkish ~~up~~ Jupiters and replacing with Polaris

Rusk/Foster: Missiles in Turkey and Italy will be turned over to UN for destruction.

Rusk: mobilization measures.

P. 1st go immediately to Turks

2d go to general NATO meeting.

Message to 1: may be necessary to fire. May involve risk.
Also taking up in NATO

and more effective

Monday morning.

Keisky, made proposal.

Fact is, no use, made proposal a year ago. Got to convince Turks to make the proposal.

30. State Dept. Bundy, Tyler, Nitze, Oct 28 ((27??)) 3 PM

Making impossible possible.

What bears on problems today.
Turkish missiles are there, in context.

Phil Tulbott

Special hazard for Turks.

Alliance cannot be reconstituted in form we have known it.

Put Polaris in East Med. Say to Turks this best alternative we can offer them. Unless you announce you are standing down these missiles for a temporary period. so as to avoid any misunderstanding.

Stick to your guns
Stand down your missiles
Plunging out, substituting Polaris

Would work under time
How to explain now

Have sent Polaris to Turkish waters and have stood down.

Oct 29, 1962 Nitze notes

Talk to Taylor, so he Taylor understands and Chaffs and Strother, make converts, can't do just by instruction

...Jupiter
1st May at latest

Negotiations with USSR
Get them out bilaterally
Multilateral Med.

Bilaterally with Italy and Turkey
Agree to have Setaf
Agree to replace Corporals with Sergeants, Pershings

Pershings

Mediterranean mult.

Polaris deployment

Commitment to NATO

not to be withdrawn except with agreement of NATO

Thornycroft--Ornsby-Gore

Reasonable--no decision 3 or 4 weeks for review. Cancellation one alternative. Recognized political consider alternatives. Serious problem. Endeavor present to avoid avoid greater problem. Excited, but not govt. would fall.

Also said, sent to Chief 2 days. end of 10 days go to London. If recommendation. asks people to work on alternatives.

1. Hounddog to V Bombers (Harold Brown). Those which were to take Skybolts
2. Other alternatives--Charyk
3. British complete, we subsidize. Production cost for small quantity. Premium not too great.
4. Might Polaris type ~~program~~ program available. Future objectives.

31.

White House, 10 AM 31 Oct

Columbian crisis. Minister of Defense.

Rockefeller critical that we didn't detect earlier.

McCone critical of intelligence community.

Are we creating sanctuary for Castro.

We have evidence now that they ~~in~~ may be violating the agreement and what are we going to do about it. What have we got to support the opposite conclusion.

R. Postpone press conference from Thursday to Friday.

Nov 19 W.H. 10AM Nitze notes

...R: Overflights. Effect on Castro. Mikoyan. No high military targets.

McN: Primarily a political question.

McN: Chiefs recommend 3 ports 2 planes

P: Political. Waiting till Press Conf. Does it increase possibility of deal.

G: McCloy Kuz would have said yes if he had authority. Wouldn't fly low.

r: Public impact

B: Public makes little distinction between high and low.

P: Not today. Contingency plan up to date. Is plane at big disadvantage.

McN: What do we do if shot at, not shot down.

B. Quarantine as an alternative.

Ball. Effect on Castro. Establish intention by picking least dangerous place or places. Castro talked about low level. Cubans don't see high.

Th: Possible SAMS will be activated if we shoot. Might add to break if we fire on ack ack. Would prefer attack on Cuba to quarantine.

P; They may respond.

P: India-Chinese question.

Th: Should keep road to coexistence open. Not publicize aid to India.

Signs near open break.

P: How can Castro change order. By Thursday. We will down one of 2 roads. Will have to explain why. Another OAMS meeting.

B: Set tomorrow as the end of negotiation track. Renew resolution.

P: How about blockade.

B: Don't decide tomorrow.

Ball: Don't let Soviets too easily (NATO). No adverse reaction to POL. Democracies willing to think other fellow not so bad.

P: How can Khrushchev submit 2d time.

N. Lack of comparability to Western reaction. (Ball Paper).

R: Don't call OAS until press conference.

B. Value of consultation we did do.

P. Don't put up things you won't get. Feel out the L.A.'s on OAS resolution

P. Do we put main emphasis on 28's or surveillance.

13 00-01 17 Jan 1962 The threat to US security interests
in the Caribbean Area

(over the next two decades).

Cuba and any other Caribbean state which fell under Communist control could be used by the USSR as areas in which to establish missile, submarine, or air bases, designed to bring North America under attack or to add to the deterrents to any conceivable US military action in the Caribbean or elsewhere. On the whole, we believe the establishment of such Soviet bases is unlikely for some time to come. Their military and psychological value, in Soviet eyes, would probably not be great enough to override the risks involved.

The Soviet leaders would be concerned lest steps toward the establishment of such bases would provoke the US to overthrow the Castro regime before bases could become operational and would generally heighten the risk of war. Moreover, Soviet bases in Cuba could involve the USSR in difficult political and control problems with the Cuban government; the Soviets have been very careful to retain control over situations which involve them in any serious degree of risk, and they would be mindful of the danger that Cuban initiatives could expose the USSR to serious risks of general war.

((Note U-2 shootdown of 27 Oct!)) Finally, the Soviet leaders, for the present at least, appear to prefer not to make their presence too obvious or apparent, lest they discourage rather than encourage the spread of communism to other Latin American countries. Since their essential aim in Latin America is not military conquest but communist revolution, we believe they will prefer to use Cuba as a symbol of spontaneous revolution and as a base for subversive operations.

((No mention of goals in Europe that might seem urgent, might be served by missiles--not just base--in Cuba.))

Nevertheless, the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. ((Fishing port!)) For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes.

This reluctance to establish military bases might not extend over the entire period under review. ((two decades)) If communism spread to other countries in the area, and if the US appeared to be weakening in world power and national will, the Soviet leaders might be emboldened to buttress their gains by openly establishing Soviet military bases in the area, with the object of further weakening US prestige and further strengthening and protecting their local satraps. If such bases were established, the first step might be the establishment of jointly-operated submarine or air bases, on the theory that the establishment of such bases would be less likely to incur risk of a US reaction than would the establishment of missile bases, while at the same time constituting a demonstration of Soviet presence and protection.

Sit and Prospects in Cuba 85-82 21 March 1962

It is notable that Bloc military deliveries to Cuba to date have been such as to enhance Cuba's capabilities for defense against external attack and for the maintenance of internal security rather than to contribute to the development of an independent offensive military capability. The Bloc has provided no strategic weapon systems. Although the Cuban army has been made formidable by Carib. standards, Cuba lacks the air and naval capabilities required for major overseas military operations, even at Carib. distances. The bomber force is still limited to a few inherited B-26's.

These Bloc military deliveries have been responsive to the most urgent requirements of the Castro regime, but they probably also reflect a deliberate Bloc policy. In keeping with its demonstrated concern to avoid any commitment to come to the defense of Cuba with its own forces, the USSR presumably desires to avoid the possible Sov involvement inherent in providing Cuba with independent means for taking major military action against its neighbors.

On these grounds, we believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with air, missile, or naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas, or that it will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. This attitude would not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units. It would also not preclude the provision of a token number of Il-2s jet light bombers. Special Sov comm and intell. facilities will probably be established in Cuba.

((So: from past behavior, Sov intentions and motives are deduced, and from these, future behavior predicted; the bet is against change in behavior. (But what precludes change in motives, goal?)

Note early origin of offensive-defensive distinction, precise lines drawn in Sept 13 statement (except for Il-2s); prediction of everything except: a) SU combat units, large personnel base; b) large number of Il-2s; c) MRBM-IRBMs.

(Had estimate changed at all as of 1 Aug? 19 Sept? Were any "surprises" noted at all by then?)

If the overthrow of the regime should be seriously threatened by either external or internal forces, the USSR would almost certainly not intervene directly with its own forces. However, interpreting even an internal threat as US intervention, the USSR would seek to deter the US by vigorous political action, including threats of retaliation on the periphery of the Bloc as well as ambiguous references to Soviet nuclear power. Nevertheless, the USSR would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba.

((Is there a hint of following methodology: 1) Deduce past SO goals from past action; 2) extrapolate future actions on assumption that goals are constant?))

Moscow 101 100, 3 Sept 62

On the basis of existing intelligence the Sov military deliveries to Cuba do not constitute a substantial threat to US security. They do constitute a deterrent to certain types of surveillance... They also constitute evidence that Moscow, having been frustrated in certain directions, is in a mood to double its bet rather than cut its losses, at least on a selective basis. In this case, Moscow has moved strongly but defensively to meet Castro's anxieties about overflights and other intrusions, and to shore up his flagrantly weak economy.

These deliveries constitute, further:

1. A psychological move of some power in the Caribbean and in the rest of Latin America...
2. A psychological move likely to heighten US domestic anxiety with respect to Cuba.
3. A testing thrust by Moscow, which, at considerable financial cost and further commitment of prestige, places before us the question of where and how we should draw the line with respect to unacceptable action and behavior by the Communists in Cuba and the hemisphere.

We face, therefore, a problem of both formulating a reaction and articulating it in ways designed to: diminish the political costs under 1 and 2, above; minimize the likelihood of any further extension of Cuban capabilities or Soviet capabilities in Cuba; and provide the legal and policy basis, under certain contingent circumstances, for the liquidation of communism in Cuba by force.

A. Drawing the line. The ambiguities in the public mind, here and abroad, about the military meaning of the Soviet deliveries require not merely that we explain what they are and why-- up to a point-- we are prepared to regard them as acceptable, but that we also clarify the kinds of installations and capabilities emplaced in Cuba which we would regard as unacceptable. The President must consider going beyond his statement of April 20, 1961: "I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our nation!" These deliveries, rightly or wrongly, raise the question in the public mind of the security of the nation; and it may, therefore, be appropriate to indicate what we would not be prepared to accept without direct military reposte. In general, that line should be drawn at the installation in Cuba or in Cuban waters of nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles, sea or land based. There may be other types of aggressive instruments that we would wish to include in this definition. In addition, this may be an appropriate occasion to underline our willingness to act with others in the Hemisphere against Cuba should Castro undertake direct or indirect aggression against other Latin American nations.

2.

The Comm position will, undoubtedly, be that we have established on the Eurasian land mass military installations proximate to their borders, including nuclear delivery capabilities. Our reply must be and can be that by regional security action, provided for under the Charter of the UN, this Hemisphere operates under a different set of rules than the Eurasian land mass. In this context, it should be noted that we would be playing directly into Moscow's hands to use the occasion of pressure on us in Cuba to withdraw THORS from Turkey. ((Who brought t is up?)) There is no clear stopping place for Communist activities based in Cuba unless we hold fast to the special status in Hemisphere law and agreement of "extra-continental" intervention.

...Our NATO allies must come to understand that we are not prepared to accept symmetry between the Allied position on the Eurasian land mass and the Communist presence in this Hemisphere; and that a condition for understanding with Washington is their recognition of the seriousness of this matter to us.

((Asked by Pres to review Cuba over the weekend, after having been out of it. Pres read; no feedback, however. Basis for Sept 4 statement?

Any planning on ~~extra~~ possible actions if they did put in nuclears? see NSAM 181. R mentions blockade, invasion, air strike; adds possibility of commando raid to destroy installations. discusses covert actions.

Was commitment mainly a chance to say something bold (about what we would do in other circumstances), thus allaying criticism of our acceptance as being weakness; (note parallel to planning something bold, while accepting current opposing actions); did Moscow interpret it this way? Is this the way, in fact, commitments get made? (e.g., British commitment to Poland) Similar to acceptance of a fait accompli: we will act very bravely and swiftly, next time ("We are bold, despite current inaction; witness our bold staking of prestige and planning for action.")

(R's interpretation of Moscow's readiness to double its bets reflects his paper of a week earlier on K's incentives to gamble. His view was that a sense of weakness and failure was a motive to K to take a gamble with a high risk (R thinks K thought odds were no better than 50-50; I suspect, much better) of considerable prestige failure--though not of military loss, since he would withdraw. Hence, R not surprised when missiles appeared; and R's expectation was that he would withdraw them if confronted with a high risk of military action, without need for any concessions by us. R fought strongly against deal, on Wednesday--Saturday: representing J, Tyler, Owen, along with Nitze and Rusk, vs 10, McG, (Ball?), (JFK?). R not surprised when K withdrew on Sunday; doesn't know expectations just prior to that of ExComm.

R did know of Friday night letter Friday night (consider Saturday morning meeting!). Was working on "surgical" air plan; (thinks McN countered JCS 1500-sortie proposal with proposal for 6).
Thinks Pres would have hit

GWB recommendation to Pres

I am persuaded that the disadvantages of an air strike are too great for us to undertake it. I have, therefore, concluded that the blockade plan--while by no means wholly satisfactory--is the course we should follow.

...begun with assumption that the Sov nuc build-up in Cuba does not add appreciably to the Sov ability to impose destruction on the US...

If this assumption be valid--and I have heard no compelling arguments against it--then the menace we face is not the addition of new Sov military capabilities so much as their moral and propaganda advantage. As I understand it, the proponents of the strike plan insist that what we are facing is a test of will that will be witnessed by all the world. Unless the US is prepared to use decisive military power, the world will lose confidence in our strength and determination.

But I think that--far from establishing our moral strength--we would, in fact, alienate a great part of the civilized world by behaving in a manner wholly contrary to our traditions

drafts: 3

103 first draft, 20 Oct

(Sept 11, Gromyko statements). The USA need not and cannot tolerate deliberate, deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.

(final: Neither the US nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.) (Suez?)

We no longer live in a world where only an actual "armed attack" as Article 51 of the UN Charter originally intended the phrase, represents a challenge to a nation's security.

(We no longer...where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril.)

Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantial increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in the nature of their threat, may well require an act of self-defense.

(...or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.)

.....
Nevertheless American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines. In that sense, our danger has not been greatly increased. ((in pencil: has not been altered in kind but has been substantially increased.))

(final: In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger ((third draft, 21 Oct: simply add)) --although it should be noted that the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.)

Blockade: And let me make it clear that it will not only prevent completion of the current offensive build-up. It will also require the Soviet Union to choose between fighting the American Navy in American waters, or abandoning its obligations to Mr. Castro. It will also have, in a comparatively short time, a profound effect on the military, economic and political underpinnings of the Castro regime; and it will be continued until all missiles and offensive bases are gone from that island.

(final: deleted.)

first draft: 2

I have directed our military forces...
secondly, (close surveillance); ; to take
further military action if that build-up continues, threatens
and so requires;

((final: Should these offensive military preparations
continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere,
further action will be justified. I have directed the
Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust
that in the interests of both the Cuban people and the
Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned
of continuing this threat will be recognized.))

...to include these air and missile bases on the targeting system
of our strategic and retaliatory forces; and finally, to
regard any missile launched from Cuba as an attack by the SU
requiring a massive retaliatory response upon the SU.

((final: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard
any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation
in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the SU upon
the US, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the SU.))

(contrast McN backgrounder, Oct 22. Controversy, reasons,
on this wording?)

...

I am asking Soviet Chairman Khrushchev, who will shortly be
coming to the UN meeting in New York, to meet with me at the
earliest opportunity with respect to this provocative threat to
world peace and the relations between our two countries.

((I call upon Chairman K to halt and eliminate this clan-
destine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace
and to stable relations between our two nations.))

...But we will not negotiate with a gun at our heads--a gun
that imperils innocent Cubans as well as Americans. Our byword
is: "Negotiation yes, intimidation no!" That is why this threat--
or any other threat which is made independently or in response
to our blockade--must and will be met with determination; and
therefore, while any talks go on, our forces all over the world
will be alert--and the blockade will remain.

(; But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these
problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why...
made independently or in response to our actions this week--
(last part deleted).))

One path we shall never choose--the path of ~~submission~~ surrender
or submission. I tell you, therefore, that these missiles now
in Cuba will someday go--and no others will take their place.

((last sentence deleted))

drafts: 3

Original deprecates ~~threat~~ ~~emphasizes~~ military significance, emphasizes "defiance," deception. Final stresses increased threat, provocative change, clandestine move, threat to Latin America.

First amounts to justifying preventive or preemptive attack.

Initial emphasizes blockade as answer; only provisionally mentions possibility of further military action; says missiles will go someday.

Final emphasizes possibility of further military if preparations continue; implies action this week; does not emphasize blockade as answer to buildup.

Initial suggests summit conf, negotiation as answer to continued buildup; final does not.

Initial merely quotes Sept 11 and Gromyko; third draft calls Sept 11 statement "patently false and misleading," calls Gromyko statements "dishonest and dishonorable."

Final: calls both false.